Constitutional Challenges to Court-Ordered Arbitration by Mann, Kimberly J.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 4 Article 11
1997
Constitutional Challenges to Court-Ordered
Arbitration
Kimberly J. Mann
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kimberly J. Mann, Constitutional Challenges to Court-Ordered Arbitration, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1055 (1997) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol24/iss4/11
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO 
 COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION 
 
Kimberly J. Mann
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMER 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 4 
 
Recommended citation: Kimberly J. Mann, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Court-
Ordered Arbitration, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1055 (1997).  
1055
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO COURT-
ORDERED ARBITRATION
KIMBERLY J. MANN*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1055
II. TRIAL BY JURY ................................................................................................... 1056
III. DUE PROCESS .................................................................................................... 1059
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS.................................................................................... 1062
V. EQUAL PROTECTION........................................................................................... 1064
VI. ACCESS TO COURTS............................................................................................ 1066
VII. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 1067
I.   INTRODUCTION
Legislatures and courts encourage, and sometimes require, par-
ties to resolve their disputes using various alternatives to litigation.
These alternative methods have the potential to increase the parties’
satisfaction with the process and relieve stress on the court system.
Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration1 is one such alternative.
This method requires parties to present their dispute to an arbitra-
tor or a panel of arbitrators for resolution. When parties are ordered
to arbitrate, however, they face the possibility of losing their day in
court. For example, some jurisdictions have allowed judges to deny
motions for a trial de novo when a party can show that it did not
adequately participate in the arbitration.2 Moreover, although par-
ties may request a trial de novo if they are not satisfied with an arbi-
tration result, those who do so are sometimes penalized if the result of
the new trial is not more favorable than the arbitration decision.3
Parties who feel that mandatory, nonbinding arbitration deprives
them of their day in court have challenged such arbitration on a va-
riety of federal and state constitutional grounds. This Comment ex-
                                                                                                                   
* The author thanks Professor Jean R. Sternlight and Florida Dispute Resolution
Center Director Sharon Press for their assistance in reviewing this Comment.
1. This Comment uses the term “arbitration” to refer to this variety of dispute
resolution. Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration is distinguishable from voluntary,
binding arbitration. Binding arbitration is typically a contractual obligation through
which parties place the final disposition of their dispute in the hands of an arbitrator or
arbitration panel. See FLA. STAT. § 44.104 (1995) (permitting parties in a civil action to
submit their dispute to a court-appointed arbitrator). The United States Supreme Court
has upheld the validity of binding arbitration agreements in order to advance new forms
of dispute resolution. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
322-26 (1985). Nonbinding arbitration leaves the option of court action open by allowing
the parties to appeal an arbitration decision through a motion for a trial de novo. See FLA.
STAT. § 44.103(5) (1995).
2. See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.103(6) (1995) (allowing the assessment of arbitration
costs, court costs, and attorney’s fees when the trial outcome is not more favorable than
the arbitration).
1056  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1055
amines the relative merits of these challenges. Part II explores
claims that arbitration deprives parties of their constitutional right
to a jury trial. Part III examines due process challenges to arbitra-
tion. Part IV considers claims that arbitration violates the doctrine
of separation of powers, while Part V explores claims that arbitra-
tion violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part VI considers whether
parties who are ordered to arbitration are denied access to the
courts. Finally, Part VII concludes that constitutional challenges
against arbitration programs are unlikely to succeed because such
programs generally do not place sufficiently heavy burdens upon
litigants to violate the Constitution.
II.   TRIAL BY JURY
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental common-law right pre-
served by the Framers of the Constitution.4 In England, jury trials
were guaranteed to parties litigating legal claims, although not equi-
table or admiralty claims.5 In the United States, the right is preserved
for claims whose origins can be traced to a common-law cause of action
that carried a jury trial right,6 or for legislatively created causes of ac-
tion that resemble those at common law.7 The Seventh Amendment’s
jury trial mandate applies only to actions brought in federal court;8
however, most state constitutions also contain jury trial guarantees.9
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed how the
Seventh Amendment applies to challenges to nonbinding alternative
dispute resolution. The Supreme Court has, however, addressed
whether a party who is forced to participate in a program analogous
to nonbinding arbitration is denied the right to a jury trial. In Capi-
tal Traction Co. v. Hof ,10 a corporation challenged a District of Co-
lumbia law that allowed justices of the peace to conduct jury trials in
                                                                                                                   
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
5. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1899).
6. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564
(1990); see also generally Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Manda-
tory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 503 (1989). As with many rights, the
right to a jury trial can be waived. See Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 21. An argument
claiming denial of this right after it has been waived is moot.
7. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 564-65 (holding that a jury trial is required for an action
brought under the National Labor Relations Act).
8. See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1874); see also Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (“The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases
is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”); Golann, supra note 6, at 503.
9. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22. The authors of one treatise found that 48 states
provide for jury trials in their constitutions. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.8 n.12 (1986).
10. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
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cases with amounts in controversy over twenty dollars.11 Although
the statute allowed parties to appeal cases decided by justices of the
peace,12 Capital Traction was concerned that it would be denied a
proper jury trial in the District of Columbia’s supreme court.13 This
concern was based upon the portion of the Seventh Amendment that
prohibits a fact determined by a jury from being re-examined.14
The Supreme Court held that a decision made by twelve men in
the presence of a justice of the peace did not constitute a trial by jury
within the meaning of Seventh Amendment.15 The Court concluded
that the facts determined by the jury before the justice of the peace
could be re-examined by a jury before a judge in the District’s su-
preme court, thus preserving Capital Traction’s right to a trial by
jury.16 The Court reasoned that the justice of the peace lacked the
judicial power traditionally present during common-law actions.17
Specifically, the Court found that unlike a judge, a justice of the
peace did not have the power to instruct the jury on the law, advise
it on the facts, or set aside the jury’s verdict if it was not supported
by the weight of the evidence.18
Courts have subsequently cited Capital Traction in support of the
proposition that arbitration does not violate the Seventh Amendment
because a party’s right to have his or her claim heard by a jury is pre-
served by the guarantee of a trial de novo.19 However, as the following
cases illustrate, parties have argued that while de novo jury trials may
protect constitutional rights, the delays and penalties suffered by par-
ties ordered to arbitration effectively impinge upon these rights.20 De-
lays appear in the form of preconditions to trial imposed on the par-
ties.21 The fact that litigants are required to participate in arbitration
before being allowed to seek a jury trial is used as an example of a pre-
condition that effectively strips away a party’s right to a jury.22
In In re Smith,23 a case brought under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a local rule requir-
                                                                                                                   
11. See id. at 3.
12. See id. at 4.
13. See id. at 3-4.
14. See id. at 7-8. The Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
15. See id. at 45.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 38.
18. See id. at 38-39.
19. See, e.g., In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955).
20. See generally Golann, supra note 6, at 505.
21. See id.
22. It should be noted, however, that considerable delays are also imposed upon trial
participants in the form of a mandatory discovery process. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
23. 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955).
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ing parties to go to arbitration did not violate Pennsylvania’s jury
trial guarantee.24 The court found that the guarantee was intended
to secure the right to a jury trial at some point before the issues were
finally determined.25 The court reasoned that the right to a jury trial
was kept intact because the courts remained open to litigants who
wished to appeal arbitration decisions.26 If onerous conditions were
placed on the availability of that right, however, the court felt that
the state’s guarantee of a jury trial would be effectively denied.27
A frequently litigated issue in right-to-jury-trial claims is whether
a penalty or precondition burdens the right to a jury trial. Two pen-
alties and preconditions frequently challenged are those that shift
costs to unsuccessful appellants and admit arbitration results in the
de novo trial. For example, in Eastin v. Broomfield ,28 the petitioner
argued that mandatory arbitration violated the jury trial right in the
Arizona Constitution.29 The petitioner argued that the admission of
arbitration findings would unduly influence the jury and effectively
eliminate the petitioner’s right to a trial by jury.30 The court held
that because the arbitrator’s decision could be appealed to a jury, the
right to a jury trial was not jeopardized.31 The court also held that
admission of the arbitration panel’s findings did not violate the right
to a jury trial because both parties had the opportunity to impeach
the findings by presenting their own evidence.32 The court analogized
the panel’s findings to the testimony of an expert witness, which is
rebuttable through the introduction of other expert testimony.33
The plaintiffs in Firelock Inc. v. District Cour t34 argued that
shifting litigation costs to unsuccessful litigants created an onerous
condition that interfered with the party’s right to a jury trial.35 The
Colorado Supreme Court held that requiring a prevailing party to
pay arbitration costs when the trial judgment was not ten percent
higher than the corresponding arbitration result was not unreason-
able.36 The court recognized that prerequisites for a jury trial were
                                                                                                                   
24. See id. at 629-31 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 6).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977).
29. See id. at 747 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23).
30. See id. at 748.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 748-49.
33. See id. at 749; cf. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915) (holding
that the introduction of an Interstate Commerce Commission report did not abridge the
right to trial by jury). But see Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 907-09
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (holding that the introduction of an arbitration panel report violated
the right to trial by jury).
34. 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
35. See id. at 1095-96.
36. See id. at 1096.
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common and, in the case of jury fees, were imposed in every case
tried before a jury.37
Although the Firelock court found that the penalty of paying arbi-
tration costs was reasonable, such a penalty can act as a deterrent.
Parties who face such a penalty may be hesitant to risk losing their
money even though they have a meritorious appeal. If a penalty is
unusually severe and deters more people from appealing than it was
meant to, it may be held unconstitutional as a barrier to the right to
a jury trial.
III.   DUE PROCESS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee due process of
law in federal and state court proceedings.38 These amendments pre-
vent the government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. A legal cause of action has tra-
ditionally been construed as a property right that is protected by the
Due Process Clause.39 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he
hallmark of property is an individual entitlement grounded in state
law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’ ”40 If courts do not
find that the arbitration process itself sufficiently protects parties’
due process rights,41 the option of a de novo appeal creates an alter-
native that should survive any due process challenge.42
In United States v. Raddatz ,43 the Supreme Court heard a due
process challenge to a federal statute that allowed magistrates to
preside over certain preliminary motions.44 In rejecting the peti-
tioner’s due process argument, the Court emphasized that the mag-
istrate’s recommendation was not a final decision.45 Instead, the final
judgment was made by a judge, who could either accept the recom-
mendation of the magistrate or rehear testimony to decide the is-
                                                                                                                   
37. See id. at 1097.
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
39. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); see also Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
40. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 (citations omitted).
41. Traditional aspects of due process include formal testimony and the right to
cross-examine witnesses. See Golann, supra note 6, at 540 n.238; see also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970) (holding that a pre-termination hearing is necessary to
provide due process to welfare recipients who are losing their benefits). However, the Su-
preme Court has held that less formal procedures may be sufficient to protect due process.
See Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (up-
holding use of mandatory binding arbitration to resolve amount of loss in fire insurance
claim).
42. See Golann, supra note 6, at 540.
43. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
44. See id. at 669.
45. See id. at 673.
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sue.46 The Court held that Raddatz’s due process rights were not
violated because the magistrate was hearing a motion rather than
conducting a full trial, and because the judge had the freedom to ac-
cept or deny the magistrate’s recommendation.47
The question raised in Raddatz can be compared with the due
process issues raised by arbitration. The power of an arbitrator is
similar to that of a magistrate. An arbitrator can make a decision
and file it with the court, but the ultimate decision lies with the
judge if the dissatisfied party elects to appeal.48
Courts have found that a party is denied due process when as-
pects of the appeals process become too burdensome. In Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co. ,49 the Supreme Court held that Logan was
denied due process because of a procedural mistake on the part of
the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission.50 Specifically,
the Commission had failed to schedule a hearing on Logan’s dis-
crimination charges within the 120 days required by Illinois law.51
The Illinois Supreme Court had held that this mistake deprived the
Commission of jurisdiction to hear Logan’s charge.52 The court had
also ruled that Logan could not refile his claim because such an ac-
tion would circumvent the Illinois Fair Employment Act’s purpose of
just and expeditious resolutions of employment disputes.53 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that Logan’s interest in his cause of action was
protected by the Due Process Clause and that he was entitled to
some sort of hearing on the merits before being deprived of his prop-
erty, i.e., his cause of action.54 The Court pointed out that Logan
could not appeal the Commission’s action.55 The Court cautioned
that the process of randomly depriving potential claimants of their
right to assert their claims presented an unjustifiably high risk of
terminating meritorious claims.56
Issues similar to those in Logan arose in challenges to medical
dispute resolution statutes in Florida and Pennsylvania. Those
                                                                                                                   
46. See id. at 680-81.
47. See id. at 683-84.
48. See id. at 680-81.
49. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
50. See id. at 437.
51. See id. at 426.
52. See id. at 427.
53. See id. (citing Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 411
N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (Ill. 1980)).
54. See id. at 433-34; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972)
(finding that a university professor’s interest in renewing his employment contract was
not sufficient to be protected by the Due Process Clause).
55. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 434.
56. See id. at 434-35; cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (holding that in-
advertent withholding of property did not deny due process when state tort law provided
an adequate remedy), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
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states’ respective supreme courts originally upheld both statutes.57
The statutes required medical-related disputes to go to mediation be-
fore proceeding to court.58 Both supreme courts felt that the state in-
terest in keeping medical malpractice costs to a minimum was strong
enough to allow the legislature to require parties to mediate before
going to court.59 However, both courts ultimately overturned their
earlier rulings.60 The Florida Supreme Court did so because the pro-
cess established by the statute proved too “arbitrary and capricious
in operation.”61 The Pennsylvania medical arbitration program
caused such lengthy delays that only 134 of the 2909 cases filed be-
tween April 1976 and December 1979 received a certificate of readi-
ness.62 Similarly, the Florida program caused delays beyond the
statutory time limits for mediation and led many Florida courts to
deprive parties of their right to mediation.63 Facially, the statutes
survived challenges on due process grounds.64 In operation, however,
the statutes proved too burdensome on litigants to satisfy due proc-
ess requirements.65 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally
addressed the concern about onerous conditions that it had first ar-
ticulated nearly twenty-five years earlier in Smith.66 Both the Penn-
sylvania and Florida decisions demonstrate that a statute that im-
poses onerous conditions in operation may be struck down even
though it facially complies with due process requirements.67
                                                                                                                   
57. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976); Parker v. Children’s
Hosp. of Philadelphia, 394 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978).
58. See Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.133 (1975)); Parker, 394
A.2d at 935-36 (citing PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.101 (Supp. 1977)).
59. See Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805; Parker, 394 A.2d at 936.
60. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d
190 (Pa. 1980).
61. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 238. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the lengthy
delays caused by the arbitration system. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 195.
62. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 194.
63. See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236-37. Among the reasons cited for the delays were
the death of a mediation panel member, clerical mistakes, and failure to select a panel in
time. See id.
64. See id. at 237-38; Mattos, 421 A.2d at 192.
65. See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 238; Mattos, 421 A.2d at 196.
66. See supra text accompanying note 27.
67. See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 237 (“While we originally upheld the facial validity of
the medical mediation act . . . the practical operation and effect of the statute has ren-
dered it unconstitutional.”); Mattos, 421 A.2d at 190 (“[W]e . . . must regrettably conclude
that the lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system . . . does in fact burden the
right of a jury trial.”).
Other grounds for due process challenges have included the admission of arbitration de-
cisions as evidence in subsequent proceedings and bond requirements for appeals. See
Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that an arbitration panel’s
finding constitutes an expert opinion that is rebuttable through introduction of competent
evidence, but that the $2000 bond required for appeal denied access to Arizona’s courts).
The arguments surrounding these challenges do not shed light on the other arguments
made on due process grounds and are not given in-depth treatment in this Comment.
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IV.   SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Constitution is premised on the doctrine of separation of
powers.68 Specifically, the Constitution establishes a tripartite sys-
tem of government in which the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches are equal and must generally refrain from intruding upon
each others’ domains.69 Mandatory arbitration has been challenged
on the ground that it violates separation of powers. The argument in
such challenges is that the legislative branch has intruded upon the
power of the judicial branch by creating a system that usurps judi-
cial authority.
Article III of the Constitution provides protection to federal
judges by providing them with life tenure, thereby eliminating sala-
ries and job security as devices for leverage by the other branches of
government.70 Separation-of-powers arguments are often premised
on a contention that one of the other branches has attempted to
thwart this security by depriving the court of jurisdiction in order to
weaken the judiciary’s influence.71 Mandatory proceedings such as
arbitration have been criticized because arbitrators are not insulated
from possible coercion from the other branches of government.72
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of Article III’s protection
of federal judges in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.73 The Court held that an act of Congress amending the
Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional because the judges sitting on
bankruptcy courts did not have Article III protection, yet the Act al-
lowed them to resolve disputes involving individuals’ private
rights.74 The Act also allowed a  bankruptcy judge to pass final
judgment on a case without bringing it before a district judge.75 The
appellants argued that the Act did not violate Article III because the
                                                                                                                   
68. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.5, at 129
(5th ed. 1995).
69. See id.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office.”).
71. See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 1989) (separa-
tion of powers challenge made under the Colorado Constitution).
72. See Golann, supra note 6, at 523 (discussing the possible pressures that can be
used to induce mediators and arbitrators to resolve cases quickly).
73. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
74. See id. at 67-72, 76. Bankruptcy is a public right, which is a “matter[ ] arising ‘be-
tween the Government and persons subject to its authority.’ ” Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crow-
ell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). “In contrast, ‘the liability of one individual to an-
other under the law as defined,’ is a matter of private rights.” Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crow-
ell, 285 U.S. at 50). The litigation of public rights requires neither a jury trial nor an Arti-
cle III judge, whereas the litigation of private rights requires both. See Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989).
75. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77-81.
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bankruptcy courts were adjuncts to the district courts.76 The Court
rejected this argument because approved adjuncts previously had
limited power and were required to apply to the district courts for
enforcement of their findings, thus providing at least some measure
of review.77 Had Congress not given bankruptcy judges final author-
ity over private rights, the Court probably would have found the
amended Bankruptcy Act constitutional.
Although Northern Pipeline  did not expressly address arbitration,
comparable principles are involved. Arbitrators do not exercise the
amount of power that Congress had given the bankruptcy judges in
Northern Pipeline . Moreover, the nonbinding decision of an arbitra-
tor may vanish if one of the parties requests a trial de novo.78 Fur-
ther, arbitrators in a nonbinding case may not enter a final judg-
ment; rather, a party must apply to the local court for final judg-
ment.79 If a state legislature were to mandate binding arbitration in
private cases, however, the constitutionality of such a requirement
would be questionable under Northern Pipeline . Nevertheless, ab-
sent application to private cases, arbitration is likely to survive
separation-of-powers challenges.
A separation-of-powers argument can only be raised under a state
constitution if that constitution contains an explicit separation of
powers clause.80 For example, the plaintiff in Firelock claimed that
the power exercised by the arbitration panel usurped the judiciary’s
power and therefore violated the state constitution.81 The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected the claim, however, holding that the panel
was not exercising sovereign authority because the decision was
nonbinding.82 The limited authority given to those who preside over
nonbinding arbitration bodes well for arbitration’s insulation from
challenges based on separation-of-powers arguments.
                                                                                                                   
76. See id. at 77. Adjuncts generally handle certain fact-finding functions to assist
the federal courts. See id.
77. See id. at 77-87 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54 (holding that the use of adminis-
trative agencies to determine issues of fact was constitutional because the sole power to
enforce the findings was with the district courts); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,
681 (1980) (holding that the use of magistrates to determine certain pretrial motions did
not violate Article III because the process was under the complete control of the judici-
ary)).
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.103(5) (1995).
79. See id.
80. The Florida Constitution contains such a clause. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3
(“The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”).
81. 776 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 1989).
82. See id. at 1094; see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (Ariz. 1977). But
see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ill. 1976) (holding that
allowing nonjudicial members of medical review panels to exercise judicial functions vio-
lated Illinois’ separation of powers doctrine).
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V.   EQUAL PROTECTION
No citizen of the United States may be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws.83 The Fourteenth Amendment not only guarantees
that the laws of the United States will be applied without illegiti-
mate distinctions based on gender or race, but also precludes dis-
criminatory application of laws based on arbitrary classifications.84
Not all classifications are unconstitutional, however. Courts apply a
strict scrutiny test to determine the validity of laws that harm a
suspect class or deprive people of fundamental rights.85 When laws
do not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, courts usually
uphold them unless they lack a rational basis.86
Courts have generally refused to void arbitration on equal protec-
tion grounds, holding that no suspect class or fundamental right is
at issue and that the arbitration requirement is rational. For exam-
ple, the plaintiffs in Firelock and Eastin argued that arbitration
violated the Equal Protection Clause because only certain litigants
were forced to go to arbitration.87 In Firelock, a Colorado law re-
quired arbitration of lawsuits for less than $50,000 in damages.88 In
Eastin, an Arizona statute required all medical malpractice suits to
go to arbitration.89 Both courts applied a rational basis test because
neither statute grouped litigants according to suspect classifica-
tions.90 Both courts found that the classifications were rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.91 The Colorado Supreme Court
                                                                                                                   
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal Protection of the laws.”).
84. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-29 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s
state constitutional amendment prohibiting governmental action to protect homosexuals
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 467-69 (1957) (hold-
ing that the creation of a closed class receiving differential treatment violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
85. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); see also Evans,
116 S. Ct. at 1627-29.
87. See Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 747 (Ariz. 1977).
88. See 776 P.2d at 1092-93. In Florida, courts are permitted to send almost any type
of dispute to nonbinding arbitration, regardless of the amount in controversy. See FLA.
STAT. § 44.103(2) (1995); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a), 1.800 (establishing that courts can refer
any case or portion thereof to arbitration except bond estreatures, habeas corpus or other
extraordinary writs, bond validations, civil or criminal contempt, and other matters speci-
fied by the chief judge).
89. See 570 P.2d at 750-51.
90. See Eastin, 570 P.2d at 751; Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098.
91. See Eastin, 570 P.2d at 750-51; Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098-99; see also Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that imperfect classifications do not offend
equal protection if the classification has some reasonable basis); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (holding that the safeguard of equal protection is offended
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held that the use of a dollar amount was not irrational.92 The court
cited several other situations in which monetary classifications are
used, including the limitation on diversity jurisdiction in federal
court.93 The court also found that the Legislature had a legitimate
interest in examining the effects of arbitration.94
The Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion in Eastin was tied to the
Legislature’s interest in curbing the costs of medical malpractice in-
surance.95 The court held that because premiums for such insurance
were doubling every three years, the Legislature had a legitimate in-
terest in treating malpractice litigants differently.96 The classifica-
tion that required malpractice litigants to use arbitration before they
went to court was held to be rationally related to the interest in
keeping malpractice costs down.97 The arbitration system created an
opportunity to separate meritorious claims from frivolous ones,98
thereby reducing the amount of malpractice litigation. Other courts,
however, have found that the differential treatment of medical mal-
practice cases serves no legitimate legislative purpose, “unless it [can]
be argued that any segment of the public in financial distress be at
least partly relieved of financial accountability for its negligence.”99
Penalties and preconditions on appeals that act as barriers to
prospective appellants have also been challenged on equal protection
grounds.100 However, the practice of shifting arbitration costs to un-
successful parties is likely to withstand most equal protection chal-
lenges based upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.101 In Crenshaw, the Court upheld a
Mississippi statute that levied a penalty on unsuccessful appellants
from money judgments.102 The penalty was fifteen percent of the to-
tal damages owed by the unsuccessful appellant, which in this case
was $243,000.103 The appellant argued that the penalty statute sin-
                                                                                                                   
when the state creates a classification that bears no rational relation to the object of the
legislation). But see Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 906-07 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1976) (holding that compulsory arbitration discriminates against medical malpractice
claimants).
92. See Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098-99.
93. See id. at 1099 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1989)).
94. See id. at 1099. The program scrutinized by the court was a pilot program used in
only a few district courts across Colorado. See id. at 1098.
95. See 570 P.2d at 751.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 836-37 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (holding that
rules requiring listing of collateral benefits in complaint and deducting certain collateral
benefits from medical claim awards violated the Equal Protection Clause).
100. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1988).
101. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
102. See id. at 85.
103. See id. at 75.
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gled out appellants from money judgments and penalized those who
were unsuccessful, regardless of the merit of their appeal.104 In up-
holding the statute, the Court endorsed as legitimate the five state
interests the Mississippi Supreme Court had earlier detailed the
statute as serving: (1) discouraging frivolous appeals; (2) providing
compensation for the appellee for having endured the tribulations of
successful litigation; (3) protecting the integrity of the judgment by
discouraging the parties from seeking a more favorable settlement; (4)
impressing upon litigants the significance of the trial itself; and (5)
conserving judicial resources by serving these other four interests.105
In light of the large penalty at issue in Crenshaw, statutes that
shift the costs of arbitration to parties who are unsuccessful on ap-
peal are likely to be upheld. Unfortunately, penalties imposed with-
out considering the cost to individuals are more likely to prevent
meritorious claims from being appealed than reduce frivolous claims.
Wealthy litigants will always be able to afford frivolous claims while
impoverished litigants will be discouraged by the risk of possible pen-
alties. Differential treatment of various claims, however, should not be
the basis for an equal protection challenge unless it can be shown that
both the purpose and application of the process are discriminatory.
VI.   ACCESS TO COURTS
Access-to-courts provisions are found only in state constitu-
tions.106 Nonetheless, access-to-courts claims are sometimes brought
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.107 A party
may be denied access to the court system in several ways. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court held in Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel 108 that re-
quiring a party to post a bond covering an opponent’s costs and at-
torney’s fees before appeal from a decision by a medical review board
created an impermissible restriction on the right of access to
courts.109 The plaintiff was given no alternative to posting the bond
and could not be heard in court until the bond was posted, which
served to cut off his access to the courts.110
                                                                                                                   
104. See id. at 80-81.
105. See id. at 81-82 (citing Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268, 274-75 (Miss.
1983)).
106. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”).
107. See Golann, supra note 6, at 547 (“[F]ederal access claims are usually analyzed
under due process principles.”); see generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382
(1971) (holding that state due process clauses require that parties not be denied divorce by
high filing fee).
108. 610 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1992).
109. See id. at 423-24 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
110. See id. at 424; see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (Ariz. 1977)
(holding that a $2000 appeal bond placed too heavy a burden on access to court). Florida
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In People ex. rel. Christiansen v. Connell ,111 a statute requiring
married couples to go to mediation before they could file for divorce
was also held to violate the parties’ access to courts.112 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that because the right
to get a divorce was granted by the state, the state could place condi-
tions on the right.113 Rather, the court found that once the right was
granted, the state could not place unconstitutional conditions on its
exercise.114 However, the same court later concluded that access to
courts was not denied when the legislature reversed the process and
required the parties go to mediation after filing suit with the court.115
The Colorado Supreme Court, dealing with the same issue in Fire-
lock, also held that requiring arbitration before litigation did not
violate the state’s constitutional guarantee of access to courts.116 The
court aptly summarized this area of law: “[A] burden on a party’s
right of access to the courts will be upheld as long as it is reason-
able.”117
VII.   CONCLUSION
Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration is emerging in various
forms throughout the country as a quick, inexpensive, and effective
alternative to litigation. Notwithstanding these benefits, arbitration
programs must be carefully designed to protect constitutional rights.
Arbitrators’ decisions must not be final in order to protect the right
to a jury trial. Arbitration statutes must comport with due process
requirements and provide access to courts, both by design and in op-
eration. In addition, arbitration statutes must allow parties to ap-
peal arbitration decisions to judicial tribunals. Finally, arbitration
statutes must be rationally related to legitimate state interests. The
constitutional challenges to arbitration that have been raised thus
far suggest that legislatures may constitutionally mandate non-
binding arbitration as long as they do not use it to deprive parties of
their day in court.
                                                                                                                   
does not require a bond when appealing a nonbinding arbitration decision. See FLA. STAT.
§ 44.103 (1995) (setting out the procedures and costs for arbitration and trials de novo).
111. 118 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. 1954).
112. See id. at 267-68.
113. See id. at 266-67.
114. See id. at 267; cf. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 496-97 (1927) (hold-
ing that companies allowed to conduct business in a state are not required to accept un-
constitutional conditions in order to continue doing business).
115. See People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 137 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1956).
116. See 776 P.2d at 1096.
117. Id. at 1096.
